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## Viewing cable 07BERN130, IRAN: SWISS FM CALMY-REY MEETS WITH LARIJANI \

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## **Understanding cables**

Every cable message consists of three parts:

- The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
- The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
- The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (<u>browse by origin</u> to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.

To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this <u>WikiSource</u> article as reference.

## **Discussing cables**

If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags **#cablegate** and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. **#07BERN130**.

**Reference ID** Created Released Classification Origin 07BERN130 2007-02-13 11:16 2011-08-30 01:44 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Bern

Appears in these articles:

http://www.letemps.ch/swiss papers

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VZCZCXRO5924
OO RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHDIR RUEHKUK
DE RUEHSW #0130/01 0441116
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 131116Z FEB 07
FM AMEMBASSY BERN
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3681
INFO RUCNIRA/IRAN COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
2007-02-13 11:16:00 07BERN130 Embassy Bern CONFIDENTIAL 07BERN113 VZCZCXRO5924\
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STATE FOR P, NEA, EUR, ISN \
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/13/2017 \
TAGS: PARM KNNP PREL ETTC IR SZ
SUBJECT: IRAN: SWISS FM CALMY-REY MEETS WITH LARIJANI \
REF: BERN 113 \
Classified By: DCM CAROL URBAN, REASONS 1.4 B/D \
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Summary \
1.(C) Swiss FM Calmy-Rey met with visiting Iranian nuclear \
negotiator Larijani on February 12 to review a Swiss 4-point \
proposal on how to resolve the nuclear impasse. Swiss \
officials disputed press reports that their effort comprised \
"mediation effort" or an "initiative," and emphasized the \
proposal's consistency with UNSCR 1737. Conditions included \
suspensor of enrichment prior to talks; full congression \
with the IAEA (including the long-awaited timetable); \
transfer of all enrichment activities to a consortium; all \
followed by a comprehensive settlement on nuclear, economic, \setminus
security, and political issues. Scheurer denied an Iranian \
news report that the Swiss had offered up the possibility of \ a partial suspension of enrichment activities. Larijani, for \
his part, told Calmy-Rey that she was even less flexible than \
the EU's Solana. The Iranians had little concrete to offer, \but Scheurer said he detected a more "constructive spirit" in \
the discussion. DCM reiterated Washington's concerns about \
Swiss efforts, particularly in light of Switzerland's status \ as Protecting Power for the United States in Tehran. End \
summary. \
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Swiss 4-Point Proposition \
2.(C) Iranian nuclear negotiator Ali Larijani met with Swiss \
Foreign Minister Micheline Calmy-Rey in Bern on February 12 \
after attending the Munich International Security Conference, \ or "Wehrkunde," over the weekend. Larijani's aide Sayaad \
Monfarad and Deputy Foreign Minister Sa'id Jalili accompanied \
him. On February 13, Swiss Department of Foreign Affairs \
Iran expert Guillaume Scheurer invited DCM and Poloff for a \briefing on the talks, in order to reassure the USG that \
Switzerland is abiding by the consensus reflected in UN \
Security Council Resolution 1737. Calmy-Rey, he said, \bluntly told Larijani of Iran's isolation on the nuclear \
issue, its obligation to abide by UNSC and IAEA requirements, \
the present risk of escalation, and the imperative for Iran \
to be transparent and constructive in seeking a solution. \
3.(C) Scheurer dismissed as "media spin" various press \ reports of a "Swiss Initiative" and "Swiss mediation." \ Rather, he said, FM Calmy-Rey (and State Secretary Ambuehl \
the previous week -- see reftel) had merely given Larijani a \ "proposition" to resolve the current impasse. The \
proposition's four points were as follows: \
Mathread A. Before talks begin, Iran commits itself to suspend all \
enrichment-related activities and to act in accommodation \
with provisions of the Additional Protocol, pending \
ratification of the Iranian Parliament, and to go beyond \
these provisions when demanded by the IAEA; \
Three weeks after the start of talks, Iran presents a \
timetable for resolving outstanding issues with the IAEA; \
\PC. A concrete proposal will be devised concerning an eventual \setminus
consortium, through which all further Iranian enrichment \
activities will be transferred; \
\PD. As soon as the above steps are achieved, negotiators will \setminus
consider a comprehensive settlement package which includes \
nuclear and non-nuclear areas, such as economic cooperation,
international security, and political dialogue (akin to past \ EU proposals, according to Scheurer). \
4.(C) Scheurer insisted that the Swiss proposal did not, \
repeat not, offer up a "partial suspension," as was reported \by the Iranian news agency "Flash News" on February 12. He \said FM Calmy-Rey had been angered when she read the Iranian \
spokesman's statement to Flash. Scheurer said that Calmy-Rey \ had raised the notion of a "temporary suspension," though she \ asserted that anything the Iranians did would have to be in \
compliance with the IAEA. \
Larijani's Reaction: Nothing Concrete, but a Better Spirit \
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5.(C) According to Scheurer, Larijani told Calmy-Rey she was \
even less flexible than Solana. He reiterated Tehran's long
list of complaints about the West's lack of respect for Iran. \
 He repeated his comments from Wehrkunde, asserting that, \
BERN 00000130 002 OF 002 \
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whatever the past, Iran was currently in compliance with the \
IAEA and that Iran should not be punished for violations it \
had yet to commit. A potential consortium, he argued, must \
be in Iranian territory, not abroad. Suspension was \
unacceptable as a precondition, though it could be the \
subject of "pre-talks," which he envisioned lasting up to two \
months. \
6.(C) Asked whether he heard anything new in the meeting with \
Larijani, Scheurer acknowledged that there was nothing \
concrete, but that the "spirit" of the discussions were more \
hopeful. The Iranians were more rational, less emotional \
than in previous meetings with the Swiss. Scheurer's \backslash
impression was that the Iranian side desired a solution, but \
had little idea how to get there within their current red \
lines, especially their refusal to suspend enrichment \
activities. He gathered from Solana's people in Munich that \
they had the same impression. \
Washington's Concerns \
7.(C) DCM thanked Scheurer for the briefing, but reiterated \
the USG's concerns that Tehran might confuse their activities \
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7.(C) DCM thanked Scheurer for the briefing, but reiterated \
the USG's concerns that Tehran might confuse their activities \
with Switzerland's status as Protecting Power in Iran. She \
handed Scheurer the Department's guidance describing Iran's \
need to comply with the UNSC and IAEA. Scheurer said that \
Bern was aware of the USG's concerns, but insisted that \
officials always stressed to their Iranian interlocutors that \
they were not speaking for Washington. He was confident that \
Tehran understood this. \
CONEWAY \